Countering Asymmetrical Warfare in the 21st Century; Strategic Insights, v. 7 issue 3 (July 2008) by Long, David E.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications
2008-07-01
Countering Asymmetrical Warfare in the
21st Century; Strategic Insights, v. 7
issue 3 (July 2008)
Long, David E.
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
Strategic Insights, V. 7 issue 3 (July 2008)
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/11270
 Countering Asymmetrical Warfare in the 21st Century: A Grand 
Strategic Vision 
by David E. Long  
Strategic Insights is a bi-monthly electronic journal produced by the Center for Contemporary 
Conflict at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. The views expressed here are 
those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of NPS, the Department of 
Defense, or the U.S. Government. 
Introduction 
There is growing evidence that asymmetrical warfare has become a strategy of choice among 
dissident, extremist political groups and will be the most likely national and international security 
threat in the 21st century. Operating in small, covert groups, and having no recognized sovereign 
territory or population to defend, asymmetrical combatants can engage in violent, lethal activities 
with far less risk of being totally overwhelmed by reprisals that a nation-state might face. In 
addition, those killed in action can be portrayed as martyrs and used to recruit more converts to 
the cause.  
A great many lessons have been learned over the years on how to counter asymmetrical threats, 
and the breadth, complexity and international scope of the threat are now generally recognized. 
Moreover, much has been written on countering the threat, particularly since the September 11 
terrorist attacks, and many corrective measures have been suggested and adopted. But as yet, 
there has as yet not been a grand strategic vision encompassing all the many, varied facets of 
the threat.  
It has not been a lack of understanding or of lessons learned about the many varied elements of 
asymmetrical warfare that has lead to the lack of progress in effectively countering threats in 
recent years. Rather it has been has been the lack of a new, comprehensive strategic vision 
against what is essentially a new and different type of armed conflict. The intention of this article 
is to help fill that gap.  
The focus is on containing future threats, not on critiquing past failures. The Soviet experience in 
Afghanistan, the abortive Israeli attack on Hezbollah in 2006 and the Bush Administration's 
ongoing Global War On Terror (GWOT) are only instructive only in pointing out that reliance on 
conventional military strategies is inadequate to meet what has essentially evolved into a totally 
new national and, indeed, global security threat.  
The Nature of Asymmetrical Warfare 
Motivation 
"War," wrote Carl Von Clausewitz, "is the continuation of politics by other means." Asymmetrical 
warfare refers to armed conflicts to achieve political objectives, and as the name implies, involves 
a disproportionate distribution of power. Unlike most conventional warfare, it is usually (though 
not always) initiated by the weaker side. Perhaps the first question that needs to be addressed, 
therefore, is why rational persons who are overwhelmingly outclassed militarily would resort to 
armed conflict.  
One popular explanation commonly heard is that asymmetrical combatants are either mentally 
deranged, morally depraved, or a combination of both. That notion has been rejected by social 
science research on asymmetrical behavior. Simply stated, the psychology behind unsanctioned 
lethal violence "is normal psychology, abnormal only in the intensity of the group dynamics that 
link causes with comrades."[1] As for moral depravity, a case can be made that asymmetrical 
combatants tend to be among the most fanatically moralistic people on earth. Asymmetrical 
warfare is generally a strategy of last resort, and those who engage in it are convinced that their 
political ends are so morally imperative that they justify whatever means are necessary to achieve 
them  
Another explanation, often applied to Islamic Jihadism, is that the extremist ideology espoused by 
asymmetrical organizations is itself a primary motivating factor in convincing people to commit 
evil, immoral lethal acts by imbuing them with hatred toward the perceived enemy. The fallacy 
here is that hostility (hatred) is rarely if ever created by indoctrination of an extremist ideology 
unless there is a predisposition to want to believe it. According to social psychology, fear and 
grievance, not dogma, are the two root causes of anger which for some can lead over time to 
hostility. In seeking an outlet for that hostility, some people ultimately resort to committing lethal 
violent acts. The role of ideology, therefore, is more often to justify rather than to motivate people 
to commit otherwise criminal and anti-social behavior.  
In addition, virtually all major political ideologies, sectarian as well as secular, present a wide 
array of peaceful as well as violent alternatives.[2] Thus, one cannot adequately understand why 
people engage in lethal asymmetrical acts by analyzing asymmetrical ideologies since the factors 
that motivate people to embrace this or that ideology lie outside as well as inside the parameters 
of ideological precepts.[3] In sum, one does not normally "learn" hostility from exposure to 
extremist dogmas. The initial stage is developing a predisposition to commit violence in response 
to the fears and grievances, regardless of their source.  
A major source of fear and grievance is future shock, particularly in traditional societies. The rapid 
pace of modernization in recent years, accelerated by unprecedented advances in 
communications and information technology and by economic and social globalization is 
universal. It has been particularly disorienting and stressful to members of traditional societies. 
The spread of secular western cultural values that inevitably accompany rapid modernization is 
particularly threatening to people whose cultural norms are based on religious values that have 
remained unchanged for centuries.  
Those who harbor a high degree of fear, grievance and hostility as a result of future shock 
constitute a major pool of potential recruits and supporters for asymmetrical organizations. And 
once they are convinced that outside powers are the underlying source of all their grievances, the 
indiscriminate use of counter force by those powers is more likely to strengthen rather than 
undermine participation and support, even among those not personally prone to violence 
themselves. Identifying and reaching out to members of this group, therefore, is a major priority 
for asymmetrical organizations seeking to gain recruits as and supporters without whom they 
cannot long survive.  
Group psychology can also play an important role in motivating people to join asymmetrical 
organizations. Many combatants have already bonded before joining an asymmetrical 
organization. In addition, as Clark McCauley notes, "Group identification makes sense of sacrifice 
by people who are not frustrated or insulted."[4] Moreover, asymmetrical organizations often tend 
to develop fanatical countercultures with their own codes of behavior that tend to be on the fringe 
of what is normally acceptable, and into which all new recruits are indoctrinated. 
Asymmetrical Strategic Objectives 
Although all armed political conflicts have much in common, their strategic objectives can differ 
widely. The primary strategic objective of asymmetrical warfare is psychological, not military. It is 
to intimidate the adversary psychologically by directly or indirectly inflicting fear and terror in order 
to achieve its political agenda. In more descriptive terms, it is, "the combined use and threat of 
violence that is directed at one set a targets—the victims—to compel compliance or allegiance 
from another set of targets (targets of demands) or to impress a wider audience that is not directly 
involved in a specific conflict (the mass media, the general public, world opinion, other 
governments, etc.)"[5]  
Asymmetrical combatants generally use covert terrorist and unconventional guerrilla warfare 
tactics and seek to avoid direct military encounters with the adversaries' vastly superior armed 
forces. This is in sharp contrast to conventional military warfare strategies that involve direct 
military-on-military confrontations with the strategic objective being to erode the enemy forces' will 
to fight, and thereby to produce decisive military victories that can force the defeated side to 
accept the victors' terms.  
The second but vital strategic objective in asymmetrical warfare is to win the hearts and minds of 
potential sympathizers and supporters, thereby gaining financial and logistic support, safe haven, 
and the ability to recruit new combatants. No asymmetrical organization or movement can long 
survive much less achieve its political objectives without a significant outside support system. 
Organizational and Operational Scope 
Asymmetrical warfare organizations come in all sizes, from small independent local groups to 
large multi-national operational organizations and support networks, terrorist and insurgency 
support groups. All asymmetrical organizations share the same basic psychological strategic 
objectives and the same predilection for the use of covert, unconventional military tactics. Where 
they might differ is in the scope of operations. 
There are two general types of organizational structures: individual terrorist attacks and broader 
insurgencies. Although the latter are generally carried out by larger dissident national or sub-
national organizations, asymmetrical organizations can be involved in both terrorist and insurgent 
operations. For example, al-Qaeda is a large multi-national terrorist organization that has 
undertaken individual terrorist attacks in the United States, Yemen and Saudi Arabia, but has also 
been active in insurgency operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan where the principal 
political objective is regime change.  
If successful to the degree that asymmetrical combatants can challenge a regime militarily, the 
nature of the conflict changes from asymmetrical warfare to conventional military warfare. It might 
still involve unconventional military tactics, but the combatants will have adopted conventional 
strategic military objective of destroying the enemy forces' will to fight.  
In the past, asymmetrical organizations were primarily concerned with sub-national, national and 
regional political issues. That began to change in the 1980s. Due largely to great advances in and 
easy access to communications, transportation and weapons technology, asymmetrical warfare 
has become multinational in scope, with networks and affiliate organizations in many countries. 
And as a result of globalization and the breakdown of national border security, it has also become 
transnational in operational reach, with the capability to strike across national boundaries.  
Despite the globalization of asymmetrical warfare, however, even the largest organizations are 
not monolithic in scope with unified chain of command and span of control structures comparable 
to effective national military and/or security services. Primary personal loyalty of individual 
terrorist members in large organizations and networks still generally remains within local small 
units or groups of individuals who joined and bonded together and who share many local fears 
and grievances not shared by affiliate groups elsewhere.  
Nevertheless, globalization of the threat has increasingly made asymmetrical warfare the strategy 
of choice in the 21st century for many sub-national and multinational dissident groups that are 
hopelessly outmatched militarily by their chosen adversaries. Having no national territory or 
population to defend, they can engage in violent activities with far less risk of being totally 
overwhelmed by reprisals that a nation-state might face. In addition, those killed in action can be 
portrayed as martyrs and used to recruit more converts to the cause. 
Tactics: A Work in Progress 
Asymmetrical tactics are many faceted and constantly changing. The choice of attack as well as 
the target depends on the element of surprise and the greatest psychological impact for the least 
amount downside risk of failure. Both are therefore subject to change.  
The element of surprise is crucial, creating a constant "cat and mouse" relationship between 
attackers and defenders. Attackers constantly seek the most unanticipated attacks on targets with 
the greatest amount of vulnerability. Defenders must not only reduce vulnerability of likely targets 
but must also anticipate new tactics and new target choices. For example, although there has yet 
to have been a catastrophic WMD or cyber attack, a future such attack to create massive social, 
political and economic costs casualties cannot be ruled out. 
Countering the Asymmetrical Threat 
Applying Lessons Learned  
Asymmetrical warfare is as old as recorded history, and lessons have inevitably been learned at 
each stage of its evolution. Modern asymmetrical warfare has evolved primarily since the 
beginning of the Cold War in the wake of World War II. The first major post-war insurgency of 
note occurred in Malaya where the British waged a twelve year counter-insurgency campaign 
(1948-1960). The British finally succeeded in putting down the insurgency by adopting of a joint 
civilian-military strategy that combined regaining and maintaining civil order with winning hearts 
and minds of non-combatant supporters of the insurgents.[6]  
The strategic components for how effectively to counter asymmetrical threats are well known and 
understood by most professionals. The absence of a new, comprehensive and integrated grand 
strategic vision, therefore, is not due to the lack of lessons learned. It is due more to the 
reluctance to change entrenched, outdated national security policy mindsets and also to 
inefficiencies created by internal bureaucratic politics.  
Outdated National Security Policy Mindsets  
There is still a strong predilection to view asymmetrical warfare as a low intensive subcategory of 
military conflict in general. This mindset substantially reinforces the mindset that overwhelming 
military superiority alone can effectively counter asymmetrical threats.  
Leaving aside the fact that asymmetrical warfare can involve conventional as well as 
unconventional tactics and could potentially adopt WMD tactics, a conventional military mindset is 
inadequate in countering asymmetrical threats. While it is theoretically possible to pacify 
asymmetrical adversaries and their supporters through a strategy of tactics of restricted brutality 
and ferocity, in reality the use of such a strategy is not only proscribed by international law, but 
more important, it would be virtually certain to be psychologically counter-productive in the war on 
hearts and minds. In short, asymmetrical threats cannot be countered successfully by armed 
force alone. 
Internal Bureaucratic Politics and Rivalries  
Due to the multifaceted nature of asymmetrical warfare, a successful strategic vision to counter it 
requires the integration of a wide variety of capabilities, and close cooperation and coordination 
among an unprecedented number of bureaucracies of many agencies and services—civilian and 
military, covert and overt, public and private, domestic and foreign—which have those capabilities.  
Achieving an integrated strategic vision is a major challenge. Each bureaucracy has its own 
unique institutional professional capabilities, turf, missions, institutional cultures, personnel 
systems and career tracks; collectively they have many overlapping capabilities and independent 
and at times competing missions and responsibilities. Nevertheless, changing outdated mindsets 
and overcoming bureaucratic politics and rivalries is vital. Failure adequately to achieve them 
could be the difference between success and failure in meeting the threat.  
Applying Basic Assumptions 
The following are some basic assumptions derived from lessons learned from past experience 
and from the current state of evolution of asymmetrical warfare: 
The Grand Strategic Vision must be Multi-Faceted  
Because asymmetrical warfare are multifaceted and international in scope, a counter strategy 
involves must utilize multiple capabilities from multiple sources, civilian and military, public and 
private. 
The Grand Strategic Vision Must be Comprehensive, Integrated, Coordinated, and 
Cooperative, and Where Appropriate, International  
Because of overlapping capabilities, missions and jurisdictions, no single agency, company or 
government can successfully exercise exclusive responsibility or control for all the assets 
required. 
The Organizational Structure Under the Chief Official Must Maximize Coordination and 
Cooperation at Every Level  
The organizational structure must incorporate horizontal as well as vertical coordination and 
cooperation at every level to ensure adequate managerial and operational coordination, 
particularly where bureaucratic capabilities overlap.  
Overall Responsibility for a Counter Strategy must Reside at the Highest Senior Level of 
Government  
That official must have the power, delegated from the chief executive, to insure adequate 
coordination and cooperation. At the sane time, his principal task is to coordinate, not to manage 
the operations of the agencies tasked with specific duties. 
 
The Grand Strategic Vision must be Flexible  
Asymmetrical warfare is a constant evolutionary work in progress. It must maintain the flexibility 
to respond quickly, choosing the most appropriate capabilities required for countering each 
individual threat. 
The Overall Goal of the Grand Strategic Vision Must to Provide a Blue Print for Reducing 
Asymmetrical Threats to Manageable Proportions, Not to Try to Eradicate Them 
All countries have their own political processes, cultures, environments and bureaucratic 
structures. Strategic plans in response to asymmetrical threats must therefore be tailored to meet 
individual country needs. But all countries face a common asymmetrical threat regardless of the 
idiosyncrasies of specific threats, and it has become increasingly clear since the turning of the 
21st century that asymmetrical conflicts have evolved into a major national and international 
security threat. 
At the same time, the means for waging asymmetrical warfare are too cheap, too available, and 
too tempting to be permanently eradicated, and resources required to counter it are not infinite. 
The most realistic goal, therefore, is to reduce threat level to a level that can enable societies to 
live normal lives free from fear and intimidation. 
Key Strategic Elements of a New Strategic Vision 
The strategic capabilities, responsibilities and operations required in countering the threat are 
tasked differently from country to country. Moreover, tasking is often shared or overlaps among 
multiple agencies and services. Regardless of whatever government organizational are in place 
or created to counter asymmetrical threats, however, all counter strategies must contain nine key 
elements. They are psychological programs, diplomacy, intelligence, military force, covert special 
operations, law enforcement, protective security, emergency crisis management and 
reconstruction assistance.  
Psychological Programs 
Because the strategic objective of asymmetrical combatants is psychological, the strategic 
objective of a counter strategy must also be psychological, to undermine and if possible reverse 
the will of the enemy to continue the conflict. Given the fanaticism of most asymmetrical groups 
and individual combatants, the focus of psychological programs should be primarily on denying 
them support and participation of those among the general predisposed to have common cause 
with them. No asymmetrical group can long exist without some degree of public sympathy and 
support.  
In what is essentially a battle for gaining and intimidating hearts and minds, the comparative 
advantage lies with the asymmetrical groups, which is why asymmetrical warfare has become 
increasingly popular as a strategy of last resort against far more powerful adversaries. Efforts of 
asymmetrical organizations to demonize their adversaries are complementary with their efforts to 
win supporters from disaffected people predisposed to seek a target as the cause of their pain.  
The key to the success of such psychological programs is credibility. This is an extremely difficult 
goal to achieve. Winning hearts and minds from the enemy and gaining political support for 
waging a counter asymmetrical threat are often at cross purposes due to incompatible domestic 
and foreign policy interests.  
For those reasons, three basic elements are vital for a successful psychological counter strategy. 
First, they must be conducted by all the other strategic elements. The most formal are public 
diplomacy programs, but all the other elements must include public relations programs to win and 
maintain public support for their activities. Second, all these efforts must be coordinated to 
maintain credibility. Third, all programs must be proactive as much if not more than reactive. 
Winning hearts and minds away from an adversary is far more difficult than winning them in the 
first place, and once lost, the chances of a peaceful resolution of the conflict can be next to 
nothing. And words must be matched by deeds. Otherwise, words are likely to be 
counterproductive. 
Diplomacy  
Due to the international scope and transnational reach of asymmetrical warfare, no single country 
can meet a major asymmetrical threat unilaterally. Diplomacy therefore must play a leading role in 
seeking, maintaining and participating in multinational and bilateral cooperation at the senior 
political levels of foreign governments and in facilitating cooperation and cooperation with 
counterpart agencies and companies. In countering asymmetrical warfare, a major goal is to 
create and maintain an international consensus that asymmetrical warfare is not just the concern 
of countries facing a specific threat; it is a global concern of all countries. 
Intelligence 
Because asymmetrical operations are covert, good, timely intelligence collection analysis and 
dissemination and sharing is absolutely necessary. To defeat the enemy, it is vital to identify 
asymmetrical adversaries, their locations, assets, capabilities, intentions, and targets.  
Intelligence collection, analysis are the shared responsibility of civilian and military, law 
enforcement and security and intelligence services. Not only is cooperation and sharing among 
all domestic elements crucial, but liaison with foreign intelligence services is also of major 
importance against multinational adversaries. 
Military Force 
The primary role in the use of military force has traditionally been to combat counter-military force. 
Over the past half century, however, it has increasingly become involved in counter insurgency 
operations when national security is threatened, including restoring and maintaining public order 
and assisting in public relief programs.  
Although strategic objectives differ greatly, there is no sharp line of distinction between 
operational tactics used in asymmetrical and conventional or unconventional warfare. And 
although there is as yet no precedent, there is also a possibility of a terrorist WMD attack at some 
time in the future.  
A second role of the military is maintaining civil order and public safety in conditions beyond the 
capability of law enforcement to manage, and pacification in insurgency situations. If insurgencies 
are sufficiently successful to challenge the enemy militarily, it is no longer asymmetrical warfare. 
The use of armed force in countering asymmetrical warfare, therefore, is not simply to defeat an 
enemy militarily on the battlefield. The broader objective is to neutralize the enemy's ability to 
achieve its political agenda through a psychological campaign of fear and intimidation. 
 
 Special Covert Operations 
Covert action and special operations are important elements in countering covert asymmetrical 
warfare. They include rapid response to incidents and attacks, hostage rescue, and proactive and 
preemptive strikes against asymmetrical combatants and materiel. Special operations units are 
generally military, but in some cases they can be tasked to or shared with intelligence, law 
enforcement, and protective security services. 
Law Enforcement 
Because virtually all asymmetrical warfare involves criminal activity, law enforcement services 
play a crucial role in countering asymmetrical threats. They have responsibility for a wide range of 
activities, including police, public safety and public security, forensics, criminal investigations, riot 
control and crisis and emergency management of civil disobedience.  
Responsibility for maintaining normal public safety and security is generally shared by several 
national and local civilian law enforcement and public security services and agencies. In crisis 
situations including an outbreak of terrorist activity and/or a major insurgency, these 
responsibilities must often be shared with military services, including special operations and 
counter-insurgency units.  
In meeting the law enforcement and public security needs in countering asymmetrical threats, 
therefore, a counter strategy must integrate and coordinate the efforts and responsibilities of all 
law enforcement and public security services, and where called for, include appropriate military 
units as required. If the threat is international in scope, it must also achieve international 
cooperation and coordination with Interpol and among states and with counterpart agencies 
abroad. 
Protective Security 
Protective security is defined here as providing security from criminal activities including 
asymmetrical attacks against persons and facilities, installations and equipment, including 
transportation, electronic and cyber equipment. Given the international scope and multifaceted 
scope of asymmetrical warfare, it is virtually impossible to achieve total protective security. 
Targets requiring significant public access or provide significant public services are particularly 
attractive for terrorist organizations as they provide an opportunity for broad mass media 
coverage.  
Public access and security comprise a zero-sum game; the more there is of one, the less there is 
of the other. Where public access is necessary, protective security requires seeking and optimum 
balance between the two. 
Emergency Crisis Management 
The role of emergency crisis management extends far beyond asymmetrical threats, including, for 
example major natural disasters. In either case, however they require rapid responses and longer 
term public safety and security. To the extent that crises and emergencies can be attributed to 
asymmetrical attacks, however, it is necessary for agencies tasked such responsibility to be 
represented in a comprehensive grand strategy. Not only would that insure better coordination 
and cooperation with many those responsible for many of the other elements grand strategy 
elements such as law enforcement, security and armed forces, but it would provided an early 
threat warning that could make them better prepared. 
Reconstruction Assistance 
In cases where a country has sustained damage seriously endangering its health and welfare of 
the general public and economic viability, reconstruction aid can be a key element in undermining 
hostility of a bereft population. Care must be taken, however, to avoid political influence and/or 
unethical business ethics to undermine the economic goals of reconstruction lest they be used to 
regain support by discredited asymmetrical groups. 
Conclusions 
From the above discussion, it should be clear that the strategic vision proposed here is not 
intended to be an all-purpose formula for countering all specific asymmetrical threats. Each 
country must create a strategy tailored to meet its specific domestic capabilities and political costs 
and benefits, and be flexible enough to address the specific requirements for successfully 
countering the specific threats facing it. With the advances in technology and the effects of 
continued future shock due to rapid modernization, particularly those facing but not limited to 
traditional societies, strategic plans must constantly be modified to meet evolving challenges.  
The intention here has been to identify the broad elements of modern asymmetrical warfare that 
all countries must face, and the strategic framework required to address them successfully. It is 
hoped however, that this grand strategic vision can provide an efficient and workable framework 
for how best national security strategy for meeting what is likely to be an ongoing, evolving 
international national security threat. 
For more insights into contemporary international security issues, see our Strategic Insights 
home page. To have new issues of Strategic Insights delivered to your Inbox, please email 
ccc@nps.edu with subject line "Subscribe." There is no charge, and your address will be 
used for no other purpose. 
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